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Banking and financial services in general are much regulated industries worldwide and 
therefore it is important to find out how the composition of boards of directors affects firm 
performance. Banking and finance sector has a remarkable role in financing other industries 
and households, which makes it a powerful industry. The recent banking crises have shown the 
consequences of weak firm performance, which has led to more interest on different factors and 
predictors behind firm performance in banking. 
This present Master’s thesis is an empirical study of the boards of Finnish banks and especially 
of the effects of board size and gender diversity on their performance. I am unaware of similar 
studies in the Finnish banking industry, which led to the idea to study this field futher in order to 
find out if there is a regression between firm performance and the structure of boards of 
directors of Finnish banks. 
This paper starts with a comprehensive literature review on the topic and after that the empirical 
results and conclusion of this study are presented. Literature review is mainly based on the 
discussion of recent studies of Finnish banking industry, corporate governance, bank regulation, 
organization theory, board structure and firm performance. 
It was hypothesed that bigger boards would perform worse than smaller boards. It was also 
expected that gender diversity would have only a little effect on Finnish banking. This paper 
uses regression analysis as the empirical method and the results show that both board size and 
gender diversity had very little impact on firm performance. These results are controversial to 
the earlier similar studies outside Finland.  
The homogeneity in the structure of boards of directors is making size and gender diversity bad 
predictors of firm performance in Finnish banking. The future studies should include the role of 
inside and outside directors, as they might be better predictors of firm performance in the 
Finnish banking industry. 
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HALLITUKSEN RAKENTEEN VAIKUTUS 
YRITYKSEN SUORITUSKYKYYN SUOMEN 
PANKKIALALLA 
Pankit ja rahoituslaitokset ovat erittäin säänneltyjä toimijoita niin Suomessa kuin 
kansainvälisestikin. Siksi on tärkeä ymmärtää, miten pankin hallituksen rakenne vaikuttaa sen 
suorituskykyyn. Finanssipalveluilla on erittäin suuri rooli yritysten ja yksityisten kotitalouksien 
rahoittamisessa. Viimeaikaiset pankkikriisit ovat osoittaneet, kuinka dramaattisia seurauksia 
huonolla suorituskyvyllä on maailmanlaajuisesti. 
Tämän opinnäytetyön tarkoituksena on tutkia pankkien hallituksen rakenteen vaikutusta niiden 
suorituskykyyn Suomen pankkialalla.  Tässä tutkimuksessa on keskitytty naisten määrän ja 
hallituksen koon vaikutuksen tutkimiseen. Aihetta ei ole Suomessa ennen tutkittu, ja siitä 
johtuen pankkien hallitusten rakenteiden mahdollinen suhde niiden suorituskykyyn on tärkeä 
tutkimuskohde. 
Opinnäytetyö alkaa kattavalla teoriaosuudella, joka keskittyy pääasiassa tarkastelemaan  
aiheeseen liittyvää tutkimusta Suomen pankkialasta, organisaatioteoriasta, sääntelystä, hyvästä 
hallintotavasta, hallitusrakenteista ja taloudellisen suorituskyvyn mittareista pankkialalla. 
Ensimmäisenä hypoteesinä oletetaan, ettei naisten määrällä suomalaisten pankkien 
hallituksissa ole merkittävää vaikutusta niiden suorituskykyyn. Toisen hypoteesin mukaan 
hallituksen koon kasvaessa sen suorityskyky heikkenee. 
Regressioanalyysin tulosten mukaan hallituksen koko ja naisten määrä eivät kumpikaan 
merkittävästi vaikuta pankkien suorituskykyyn Suomessa. Tutkimustulokset eroavat 
kansainvälisistä tutkimuksista, joissa suurimmassa osassa on havaittu negatiivinen regressio 
hallituksen koon kasvun ja yrityksen suorituskyvyn välillä. Tutkimustulosten perusteella voidaan 
todeta, etteivät hallituksen koko ja naisten määrä hallituksessa ole parhaita mahdollisia selittäjiä 
suorituskyvyn muutoksille. Suomalaisten pankkien hallitukset ovat rakenteeltaan melko 
homogeenisiä, mikä osaltaan selittää naisten määrän ja hallituksen koon vaikutuksen 
heikkoutta. Tulevaisuudessa samanlaisissa tutkimuksissa tulisi tutkia myös yrityksen 
hallituksessa istuvien omistajien ja ulkopuolisten henkilöiden määrän vaikutusta pankkien 
suorituskykyyn. 
   
 
ASIASANAT: 
Hallitukset, pankkien sääntely, hallituksen rakenne, finanssipalvelut,  yrityksen suorituskyky 
CONTENT 
1 INTRODUCTION 6	  
1.1 The background of the thesis 6	  
1.2 The research problem, the objectives and limitations of the thesis 6	  
1.3 The research method of the thesis 8	  
1.4 The structure of the thesis 9	  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 10	  
2.1 Finnish banking industry 10	  
2.1.1 The recent history of the Finnish banking industry 10	  
2.1.2	  Finnish banking industry today 11	  
2.2	  Banking sector as a part of the service branch 13	  
2.3	  Main concepts of organizational theory 14	  
2.4	  Corporate governance, regulation and banks 17	  
2.4.1	   International view of corporate governance and regulation 17	  
2.4.2	  Corporate governance and regulation in Finnish banking 18	  
2.5	  Board structure and firm performance 20	  
2.6	  Gender diversity and firm performance 21	  
2.6.1 Barriers to female board access 24	  
2.6.2 Positive circumstances for female board access 25	  
2.6.3 Quotas for women 26	  
2.7	  Board size and firm performance 27	  
3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 30	  
3.1 Sampling procedure and coverage 30	  
3.2	  Descriptive statistics 30	  
3.2.1	  Board structure variables 30	  
3.2.2 Descriptive statistics of board size 31	  
3.2.3 Descriptive statistics of gender diversity 32	  
3.2.4	  Descriptive statistics of bank performance measures 33	  
3.3	  Scatterplots and Correlation matrixes 35	  
3.4	  The results of multiple regression analyses 37	  
3.4.1	  Net Interest Margin 37	  
3.4.2	  Return on average assets 38	  
3.4.3	  Return on average equity 40	  
3.5	  Discussion of empirical results 41	  
3.6 The validity and reliability of the results 44	  
4 CONCLUSION 45	  
SOURCE MATERIAL 46	  
FIGURES 
Figure 1. Five circles model 14        
TABLES 
Table 1. Perspectives on gender 23    
Table 2. Frequencies of board size 31 
Table 3. Descriptives of board size 31 
Table 4. Frequencies of the percentage of females on board 32 
Table 5. Descriptives of the percentage of females on board 33 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of NIM, ROAA, ROAE 34 
Table 7. Scatterplot analysis between variables 35 
Table 8. Sample correlations 36 
Table 9. Model summary (Dependent variable NIM%) 37 
Table 10. ANOVA (Dependent variable NIM%) 37 
Table 11. Coefficients (Dependent variable NIM%) 38 
Table 12. Model summary (Dependent variable ROAA%) 38 
Table 13. ANOVA (Dependent variable ROAA%) 39 
Table 14. Coefficients (Dependent variable ROAA%) 39 
Table 15. Model summary (Dependent variable ROAE%) 40 
Table 16. ANOVA (Dependent variable ROAE%) 40 
Table 17. Coefficients (Dependent variable ROAE%) 41 
 
 
 TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Kasimir Sääksmäki 
 
6 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The background of the thesis  
The banking and finance are strictly regulated industries both in Finland and 
internationally in general. Corporate governance acts and regulations affect the 
banking industry probably more than any other business and therefore it is 
important to understand the role of boards of directors in terms of their 
capabilities to work in a regulated and unstable environment. (Pathan and Faff 
2013, 1573.) 
Banks and financial institutions are usually the most important financers of 
service business companies and therefore this research is very much related to 
the hospitality industry, too. A well performing banking industry is vital for any 
business and therefore it is important to study the different contributors to 
banks’ performance. (Pathan and Faff, 1573.) 
In board of director literature it is a recurring theme that there is a relation 
between board composition and firm performance. Researchers have found a 
relation between the board composition and the economical aspects of 
organizational performance in international studies. Therefore it is important to 
research this topic in order to find out whether similar kind of relation can be 
found in Finland and more precisely in Finnish banking. (Siciliano 1996, 1.) 
1.2 The research problem, the objectives and limitations of the thesis 
This paper was conducted in order to find out how the structure of boards of 
directors affects firm performance in Finnish banking industry. The idea for this 
paper came from doctor Pekka Vahtera, who works as a lecturer and 
researcher at Leeds University Business School in United Kingdom. He has 
studied similar kinds of topics and the purpose of this paper is to support his 
continuous research in social relations and strategic management in general. 
He also supported this paper by acting as an external mentor and advisor. 
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I am unaware of earlier similar studies in the Finnish banking industry. This 
paper concentrates on the effects of board size and gender diversity and 
excludes some other possible structure variables, such as the role of 
independent and inside members of a board. This paper is similar to the one of 
Pathan and Faff (2013) who have studied how board structure affected firm 
performance in large US bank holding companies over the period 1997- 2011. 
As there is a lack of existing studies on how gender diversity or board size 
would effect firm performance in the Finnish banking industry, my hypotheses 
will be based on earlier non- financial studies and results of studies conducted 
outside Finland. 
There is a lot of external pressure for companies to add women on the boards 
for good governance reasons. That is one of the reasons why companies have 
more gender diverisified boards. Anyway, earlier studies show little relation 
between gender diversity on boards and firm performance. (eg. Pathan & Faff 
2013, 1573.) and (Adams & Ferreira 2009, 291.). Therefore there is not a 
reason to expect more gender diversified boards of Finnish banks to perform 
better. An earlier study in Norway (Where they have women quotas) also found 
a negative relation between more gender diversified boards and firm 
performance (Adams & Ferreira 2009, 292.)  which leads to the expectation that 
there will not be a negative relation between more gender diversified boards 
since there are not women quotas in Finland. 
H1. There is not any significant relation between gender diversity on boards and 
firm performance in the Finnish banking industry. 
Most of the prior studies concerning the board size and firm performance have 
found a negative relation between them. In other words, larger boards have 
been proven to have a negative impact on firm performance. Yermack (1996, 
185.) and Eisenberg et. al (1998, 35.) were some of the first researchers who 
could prove that in non- financial firms and for example Pathan & Faff ( 2013, 
1573.) have found similar results in the banking industry. Knowing that decision 
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making and monitoring gets harder in larger boards, it can can be expected that 
a larger board has a negative impact on firm performance. 
H2. Increase in board size has a negative impact on firm performance in the 
Finnish banking industry 
1.3 The research method of the thesis 
This paper uses regression analysis as a research method. The target of the 
regression analysis is to find possible causality between variables and present it 
in a mathematical model. Multiple regression analysis was used as a method in 
this paper to find out the possible causality between board structure variables 
(board size and percentage of females) and bank performance measures Net 
interest margin, Return on average assets and Return on average equity 
(NIM%, ROAA%, ROAE%).  
The fundamental idea of multiple regression analysis is to examine how well a 
set of variables is able to predict a particular outcome. It also shows which 
variable within a set of variables is the best predictor of an outcome and 
whether a particular predictor variable is still able to predict an outcome when 
the effects of another variable are controlled for. (Pallant 2005, 140.) 
There are many different types of regression analyses that can be used but 
standard multiple regression was used in this paper. In that type of regression 
analysis all the independent (or predictor) variables  are entered into the 
equation simultaneously. Every independent variable is evaluated in terms of its 
predictive power, over and above that offered by all the other independent 
variables. (Pallant 2005, 141.) This type of regression analysis was used in this 
paper since there are two independent variables (size of a board and the 
percentage of women on a board) and I wanted to find out how much variance 
in dependent variables (NIM%, ROAA%, ROAE%) they were able to explain as 
a group or block. Standard multiple regression also shows how much unique 
variance in the dependent variable each of the independent variables explains. 
 TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Kasimir Sääksmäki 
 
9 
1.4 The structure of the thesis 
This paper starts with a comprehensive literature review of the topic. First, the 
recent history and current situation in the Finnish banking industry is reviewed 
as an introduction to the topic. After that I continue discussing of related 
subjects, such as organizational theory, corporate governance and regulation in 
order to give a broader perspective on the topic. The literature review ends with 
a discussion of recent studies on gender diversity and board size as they are 
the main items of study in this paper. I have mainly focused on studies and 
literature related to the finance sector but also included some aspects from non- 
finance studies and literature in areas where there has been a lack of existing 
literature in banking and finance. The literature review is followed by chapters of 
empirical results and conclusion.   
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Finnish banking industry 
2.1.1 The recent history of the Finnish banking industry 
Finland saw the biggest changes in it’s banking industry after a deep recession 
and banking crisis in the early 1990s. The crisis resulted in the failure of several 
major banks and of one bank group. This crisis led to a merger of two major 
bank groups and also started a reorganization of the markets with the 
rationalization of local branch networks. (Koponen 2008, 13.) 
Information technology advanced rapidly in late 1990s, which also had a big 
impact on the Finnish banking industry. Remote access technologies changed 
customer behavior, which led to an increased number of branch closures 
around the country. Simultaneously the automation of payment systems (from 
paper- based money transfers to electronic interactions) has had a very positive 
impact on the productivity of Finnish banks. The development of information 
technology has had two opposite effects on banking. Decreased level of face- 
to- face service has made local knowledge and relationships weaker but the 
development of Internet also has made it much easier for firms and customers 
to find information.  (Koponen 2008, 14-22.) 
Saksi (2013,10) argues that there has been a change in the leadership culture 
of Finnish banks in the last few decades. Authoritarian management culture has 
changed to a more transparent and democratic way of leadership. He says that 
there used be a culture of cronyism in 1980s and 1990s but it has changed 
through increased transparency and regulation by the state. In the 1990s it was 
not abnormal that a politician was a member of a board, a customer and a 
branch manager of a bank at the same time. This would not be possible 
anymore due to current legislation and control by government. 
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Finnish banks and insurance companies used their power remarkably in other 
industries in 1990s as well. This was done through simultaneous board 
memberships across different industries. A good example of this was a big bank 
merger that also led to merger in the Finnish forest industry in 1990s. This 
shows the importance and power of the Finnish finance sector companies 
during that era. (Saksi 2013, 11.) 
Ruuskanen (2009, 69) argues that Finnish banks favoured top management 
incentive programs that were focused on maintaining and growing balance 
sheets in the 1980s. He points out that it was one of the major reasons why 
branch managers were taking risks that ultimately led to the banking crisis. 
Although it was illegal to link an incentive program to the extent of banking 
business, it was common practice.  
2.1.2 Finnish banking industry today 
The banking industry has developed a lot during recent decades but banks 
basically still have three main reasons why they operate. These include the 
redistribution of resources, decentralisation of risks and the maintanance of 
functional and reliable payment systems. On an operational level the main 
duties of banks are payment transfers, borrowing and lending. Succesful 
banking is mainly based on managing different risks, which can be categorized 
as credit risks, market risks (currency risks, interest risks, liquidity risks) , 
operative risks (reputation risk, law risks) and strategic risks. (Ruuskanen 2009, 
6-7.) 
As it was pointed out earlier, cronyism is probably not an important force in 
Finnish banking industry anymore. Increased control and regulation has made 
decision making more open and transparent and for example board 
memberships in many firms of key industries are not common if even possible. 
In the 21st century Finnish banks have changed their investment strategies to  
more net income based strategies and the ownership relations in Finnish 
business do not play that significant role anymore. (Saksi 2013, 11.) 
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The role of the banking industry is essential in Finnish society. There were four 
finance sector firms in the top 15 payers of company tax in 2012. (Saksi 2013, 
11). Finland is a bank- dominated economy, but the use of new financial 
instruments and the entry of institutions for corporate finance has occured. The 
behaviour of household saving has also changed and customers do not 
anymore save using the time deposits of banks anymore. Stocks and mutual 
funds have become popular among customers and this has also forced banks 
to rethink their strategy. (Koponen 2008, 16.) 
Finland is a part of the European Union and Eurozone, which has increased the 
regulation of Finnish banks but also given them more opportunities in a bigger 
market. Some Finnish banks have branches in other European countries and 
some foreign banks have established branches in Finland. All in all, the Finnish 
banking sector has become more international, which has increased 
competition.The Common European market is the operational environment of 
Finnish banks nowadays.  
Ruuskanen (2009, 8-10) argues that the European integration development and 
the internationalization of the financial industry have diversified the business 
strategies of traditional banks in Finland. Conglomerates and finance industry 
corporations, such as General Electric Company and Mitsubishi Motors 
Corporation are an international trend. It is not hard to predict that this kind of  
development also could occur in Finland through growing internationalization 
and competition between companies. 
According to statistics from 2013, approximately 60% of Finnish banks’ funding 
came from public deposits. Net interest income was still the core of business for 
Finnish banks but as interest rates had been low, it had forced banks to 
diversify their operations and they had for example focused more on 
commission interest. Tightening regulation and new bank tax made profit 
making even harder for Finnish banks in 2013. There were almost 30 000 
people employed in almost 1400 branches in Finnish banking industry in 2013. 
Nordea Bank Finland was the biggest bank followed by OP Group and Danske 
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Bank regarding net interest income in 2013. (Federation of Finnish Financial 
Services 2014, 7.) 
2.2 Banking sector as a part of the service branch 
The Banking industry and more widely spoken financial services are a tertiary 
part of the service industry. Banks offer monetary services to companies and 
inviduals and therefore have an essential role in the everyday life of individuals 
and companies. Service development and differentiation are the keys for 
success in banking industry.  
Saksi (2013, 164- 166) points out that banking sector is still often seen as a 
static industry due to the unchanged principles of the business. Nevertheless, 
banks are continuosly developing new products, multi channel solutions and 
customer service models in order to serve their customers better and find new 
ways of profit making.  
Finnish banks should involve their customers more in development work for 
better services. Banks already offer more tailor made solutions for their 
important customers, but the services that they offer for smaller businesses and 
individuals are still mostly based on mass production. Although banks are 
developing new service models continuously, most of the work is still 
concentrated on product development. Banks could also improve their image 
and profile by listening to the ideas of their customers. (Saksi 2013, 164- 166.) 
Financial services have some specific features among the typical features of 
services. Usually services are defined as: 
- Immetarial 
- Production and consumption are simultaneous 
- Heterogeneous 
- Inability to store 
- Properties don’t move 
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There are two identifiable features in financial services. These are the 
responsible handling of assets of a customer and bidirectional information flow 
between the customer and the financial company. Responsible handling of 
assets is linked to the advisory duties and overall liability of assets. Bidirectional 
information flow is essential because both the customer and a financial firm 
need information of each other in order to use financial services. (Ylikoski & 
Järvinen 2011, 17, 19.) 
2.3 Main concepts of organizational theory  
Boards of directors are key parts of any organization and therefore it is 
important to understand the meaning of organizational theory as directors are 
simultaneously creating organizational culture and the structure of a board can 
also be seen as a result of a certain culture. There are lots of different 
organizational theories but I will concentrate on the core ideas of the modern 
day organizational theory. (Hatch 1997, 15.) 
 ENVIRONMENT
 
Figure 1. Five circles model (Hatch 1997, 15.) 
Organiza)on	  
Culture	  
Physical	  
structure	  
Technology	  
Social	  
structure	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In modernist organizational theories, the organizational environment is 
conseptualized as an entity that lies outside the organization’s boundaries. The 
organization faces uncertainty what the environment demands while it is 
depending on the elements that comprise its environment. (Hatch 1997, 63.) 
Other key parts of organizational theory are the strategy and goals of the 
company. Through organizational strategy companies try to block or take over 
competitors’ market share without losing their own. In modernist organizational 
theory, the concept of strategy basically refers to top management’s efforts to 
influence organizational outcomes by managing the company’s relationship to 
its environment. Modern organizations tend to have two distinct types of 
organizational goals. Official goals are more general while operational goals are 
more specific. Official goals are often stated by top management while 
operational goals are delegated from top management to lower levels of the 
organization as long as every member of the organization has been delegated a 
share of the overall organizational tasks. (Hatch 1997, 101, 120-121.) 
Hatch (1997, 128) defines technology as a part of organizational theory as 
follows: 
 
1) Physical or objects or artifacts including products 
and the tools and equipment used in their 
production 
2) Activities or processes that comprise the methods of 
production 
3) The knowledge needed to develop and apply 
equipment, tools and methods to produce a 
particular output 
 
 
 TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Kasimir Sääksmäki 
 
16 
The social structure of organizational theory includes job specialization, 
departmentalization and divisionalization. Furthermore, organizing concepts of 
span of control, chain of command and centralization / decentralization can be 
seen as parts of the social structure of an organization. (Linstead et.al 2009, 
199.) 
Hatch (1997, 243) argues that the physical structure of organization theory 
includes buildings and their locations, furniture and equipment, decoration and 
even human bodies. Furthermore, organizational theorists are interested in 
organizational geography, layout, and design and furniture.  
There are lots of definitons of organizational culture. Linstead et.al (2009, 159) 
point out that the key dimensions are transparency/ opaqueness and simplicity/ 
complexity. The first dimension relates to whether the culture is easily 
understood in terms of clarity, whether things are what they seem to be and 
whether the rules of the culture are immediately accessible or whether they 
need to be discerned through experience and insight. Simplicity/complexity 
relates to cultural artefacts, beliefs and assumptions.  
All these above mentioned dimensions of organizational theory are parts of the 
everyday work of a board of directors of a Finnish bank. They are both 
influenced by the environment for example through regulation and also actively 
create organizational culture and build the social and physical structures of an 
organization. The roles of top management and boards of directors are crucial 
because they are the decision- making units and their contribution to the 
performance of a firm is usually the highest.  
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2.4 Corporate governance, regulation and banks 
2.4.1 International view of corporate governance and regulation 
Corporate governance can be defined as  mechanisms, processes and relations 
by which corporations are controlled and directed. Corporate governance has 
started in the USA, where investors demanded more transparency from 
companies. Furthermore, the owners wanted to have more influence on the 
bigger decisions of their companies. There were some major abuses found at 
the same time, which led to an increase in legal regulation by the authorities. 
(Erma et.al 2010, 19.) 
Adams and Mehran (2012, 244) point out that the recent subprime mortgage 
crisis differs from the previous financial crisis because for the first time bank 
governance is accorded a lot of the blame. For example, the OECD Steering 
Group of corporate governance claims that board failures of financial firms are 
major cause of the crisis. Writers also argue that it is important to understand 
how banks are usually governed and whether the governance of banks can be 
compared to unregulated firms. 
Sarbanes- Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 and the listing rules that followed originated 
because of scandals at non financial firms. Therefore the special features of 
bank governance were not taken into account. Still, most of the post crisis 
governance was aimed at financial firms without understanding the special 
features of the banking industry. SOX mostly concentrates on the independence 
of the directors. Still, many of the bank directors are some of the best customers 
of the bank. These directors are not independent and therefore, to comply with 
SOX, banks need to exclude them from audit commitees although there are 
arguments why having customers on boards may be a good practice.  (Adams 
and Mehran 2012, 244.) 
Pathan and Faff (2013, 1573) point out that the board is even more important as 
a governance mechanism in banks than in other companies. Their fiduciary 
responsibilities extend far beyond shareholders to depositors and regulators. 
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Still, policymakers and regulators want to point out the importance of bank 
board governance. 
Pathan & Faff (2013, 1573) suggest that failures in bank governance can create 
significant costs. These costs occur since banks are special economic units 
relating to their distinctive roles in financial itermediation. Furthermore, banks 
can facilitate better firm governance either in their role as creditors or 
shareholders. Therefore, well governed banks have a positive contribution to 
the economy in general and vice versa. 
Pathan and Skully (2010, 1951) emphasize the remarkable power that 
regulators have in banking. Regulators set detailed standards of conduct for 
directors and monitor individual conformity to ensure a safe and sound bank 
system. The disciplinary actions may include suspension and removal from the 
board and also a life- long ban from the industry.  
2.4.2 Corporate governance and regulation in Finnish banking 
Saksi (2013, 77- 78) notes that many directors in the Finnish finance sector call 
the increased regulation as the ”regulation tsunami”. It equals to the massive 
amount of different regulations which increase the work load of boards and 
other adminstration remarkably. He also points out that there have been circa 
10 000 new regulations annually in recent years which have especially affected 
on smaller banks.  
Until the early 1990s Finnish banks had historically held a significant power 
position in the Finnish corporate ownership scene. There were two major 
banking spheres who also had significant ownerships in other companies. It 
was also common that the board members of the banking spheres were also 
board members in other large Finnish firms. This led to an opaqueness which 
was not disrupted until the Finnish banking crisis in the early 1990s. There 
occured  some major mergers in the banking industry which reconfigured the 
balance of power amongst large Finnish firms. Banks’ ownership of Finnish 
companies decreased throughout the 1990s. The banking crisis instigated a 
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process that moved Finland from the main- bank structure to a system where 
the stock market has a stronger influence. (Jakobsson & Korkiamäki 2014, 18- 
20.) 
Increased regulation has also influenced the work of the boards of Finnish 
banks. Commitee work has increased which has taken time from the actual 
strategy work. This has negative consequenses since board members should 
be able to trust professionals in regulation matters and concentrate on strategy 
planning and supporting the CEOs in their work. (Saksi 2013, 81.) 
Almost all corporate governance guidelines concentrate on the composition of a 
board. Usually a board with both independent and inside directors is considered 
as the best alternative. For example, the national corporate governance 
recommendation nr. 17 suggests that ” The majority of board members must be 
independent of the company and at least two members of this majority must be 
independent of the significant shareholders of the company”. (Blumme et. al 
2005, 23.)  
The most of Finnish corporate governance 2003- recommendations from 
Confederation of Finnish Industries, OMX Oyj and Finnish Chambers of 
Commerce  are based on principle ”Comply or explain”. This recommendation is 
a set of of different guidelines aiming for a more transparent decision making 
and openness in general. All Finnish publicly held companies should follow 
these guidelines in full or have justifiable reasons to ignore them. (Blumme et. al 
2005, 17.) 
Ruuskanen (2009, 163- 164) argues that the major problem of the universal  
regulation is the attitude towards societies and institutions that act according to 
their own rules. The other significant problem in the current regulation sytem is 
its Europe- centrism. The Basel committee of European Union has become the 
authority of banking monitoring and supervision although it has less than 30 
member states. 
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A lot of the literature on corporate governance concentrates on the negative 
aspects of increased regulation. Nevertheless increased regulation has 
increased transparency in the banking industry. Common European ”banking 
rules” also have created opportunities for Finnish banks to internationalize. The 
main purpose of the increased regulation is still to avoid the occurence of new 
financial crises. 
2.5 Board structure and firm performance 
Composition of the board should be based on the owners’ strategy of the future 
of the company. (Åhman et. al 2007, 2006). Erma et al. (2010, 24-26) point out 
that shareholders are usually interested in capital gain and the assets of the 
company and the directors of boards should consist of people who are able to 
execute these expectations. They also claim that diversity in board structure 
has been highlighted in Finnish companies in recent years. Pathan & Skully 
(2010, 1592) point out that the two major roles of boards of directors are 
monitoring and advising. As a monitor of management, boards of directors 
supervise managers so as to refrain them from any selfserving behaviours. 
Boards also advise management by giving them advice and opinions in key 
strategic decisions. 
There are several theories and suggestions of an optimal board structure in the 
management literature. For example, a small number of board members and 
high number of independent directors are considered to be important 
contributors to an effective board. While same theoretical framework can be 
associated to banks, it should be understood that the banking industry has its 
own special features such as high leverage and regulation which might make 
the composition of boards different. (Pathan & Skully 2010, 1591.) 
Siciliano (1996, 1313) relates resource dependence theory to the assumption 
that the selection of particular individual directors affects organizational 
performance. In this framework boards of directors are part of the organization 
and its environment and by providing information and resources to the 
organization, boards, they help to cushion it against an unstable environment. 
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On an individual basis this means that board members bring resources to their 
organizations as a result of their backgrounds. Siciliano also adds that in 
addition to this perspective, a second framework claims that board members 
perform an internal control function and can affect organizational efficiency 
through administrative efforts. Both theories claim that properly structured 
boards have the potential to influence organizational outcomes. 
As said, studies often concentrate on a few main characteristics of board 
structure. The common variables used in board composition studies include 
board size, gender diversity, institutional and regulatory influences and 
independence of directors.  
2.6 Gender diversity and firm performance 
Gender diversity and female representation in boardrooms have been 
increasingly in public debate over the recent years. The amount of female 
directors has increased steadily but slowly. For instance, the average 
percentage of female directors in US companies increased from 5, 6% in 1990 
to 15,2% in 2010. Female directors and gender diversity in all have been seen 
as contributors to firm performance, which has led to a greater female 
representation on boards. Women directors are considered to be hard working 
and have better communication skills, which contributes to the improved 
problem- solving and decision- making ability of the entire board. (Pathan & Faff 
2013, 1577.) 
Farrell and Hersch (2005, 86) have studied board composition as demand or 
supply driven activity and found out that board selection is not gender neutral 
and that the increased number of women on boards is not only a result of 
increased supply of qualified female candidates. Their results also show that 
even though there might be inside tastes to add women to boards, there might 
be outside pressure to add women directors. They also concluded that although 
better performing companies tend to have more women on the board, they 
could not find that more women on boards would automatically have influence 
on firm performance. 
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Farrel and Hersch (2005, 86) also found out that adding women to the board 
does not result in value creation or vice versa. Their results show that due to 
internal preferences or external pressure for greater gender diversity, the 
demand for female presence has allowed women to self- select better 
performing firms.  
Linstead et. al (2009, 90-91) want to emphasize five different perspectives of 
management and gender. There is a wide range of organizational literature 
which inisists that gender is taken into account when examining managerial 
work nowadays. In their studies, they have summarized key perspectives as 
follows: 
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Table 1. Perspectives on gender. Adopted from Linstead et. al (2009, 91.) 
Perspective Key concepts 
Liberal feminism -Women not naturally inferior to men 
-Importance of social justice/ equality 
-Vertical segregation (glass ceiling) 
-Horizontal segregation 
-Long agenda of equality of opportunity 
Radical feminism -Women naturally superior to men 
-Importance of social emancipation / change 
-Radical reversal/ inversion of contemporary social structures  
-Separatism 
Diversity Diversity, including gender difference should be recognized in organizations 
-Individualist focus 
-Improve productivity through a widening of organizational access and participation 
-Strong business case 
Gender 
in  management 
-Management relational 
-Women and men are socialized differently, manage differently 
-Male transactional versus female transformational leadership 
-Transformational leadershipmost effective in current socioeconomic climate 
-Globalization of gender 
Gendering 
management 
-Interaction of management and gender 
-Foucauldian- gender identity produced by discourse 
-Masculist organizational discourse sustains masculine managerial identity 
-Succesful managers (Whether male or female) therefore masculine 
-Problems of this emphasis on masculinity 
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2.6.1 Barriers to female board access 
There are a few aspects that usually are mentioned as the reasons why women 
leaders are still a minority on boards of directors. These include stereotypes, 
access to networks, limited recruitment pool and missing leadership. 
(Fitzsimmons 2012, 558- 559.) 
There is an effect called similarity bias, which means that people are 
psychologically driven to like others similar to themselves. Similarity bias could 
be the reason why male board members tend to search for board members who 
act, think and look like they do. There has been a change since the 1970s, 
when researchers found out that men actually evaluated equally qualified men 
higher than women. In recent studies it has been found out that male recruiters 
evaluate female candidates higher than male candidates now, but this does not 
lead to more job offers for female candidates. Although similarity bias seems to 
be fading over time, it still remains as an obstacle to women who wish to 
achieve board positions. Recent studies show that men actually evaluate 
women more positively than men but for the wrong reasons: based on 
stereotypes about women’s role as decorative additions to corporate boards. 
(Fitzsimmons 2012, 558- 559.) There also are gender stereotypes as job 
suitability, competence and socially appropriate role assignments that tend to 
benefit male job candidates seeking to fill positions historically dominated by 
men. (Skaggs et. al 2012, 937.) 
Women still lack access to the same old boys’ networks that men have access 
to. This is one of the reasons why female representation on boards is still low. 
This remains as a significant problem for women leaders because so much 
depends on access to informal networks. Board member nominations are still 
mostly based on recommendations from existing directors. The majority of 
directors are men and therefore women’s lack of access to informal networks is 
clearly a barrier to their inclusion on corporate boards. (Fitzsimmons 2012, 558-
559.) 
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A limited recruitment pool is often seen as a barrier for women to climb up the 
corporate ladder to top management positions. Board members are usually 
recruited from a small limited pool of directors, that lacks women. This is an 
advantage for women that are already directors. For example, Norway has a 
legislation which requires at least 40% female representation on boards. 
Anyway, only a handful of women collected 25 or more director positions after 
this quota came into effect. (Fitzsimmons 2012, 558- 559.) 
Skaggs et. al (2012, 937) point out that as the amount of women in higher 
director positions rise, they are likely to create social networks, mentoring 
relationships and political alliances which could help other women to get more 
director opportunities, too. There is a general assumption that even a few 
women in higher- level positions are likely to benefit women throughout the 
organization. Therefore there has been an increasing interest among 
researchers to find out possible ways for women to break through the ”glass 
ceiling”.   
2.6.2 Positive circumstances for female board access 
According to Fitzsimmons (2012, 562) boards of directors are especially well 
suited to benefit from increased gender diversity because their tasks are 
complex and strategic and their problems involve a wide range of stakeholders. 
She also points out that for instance financial institutions with diverse 
workforces have higher preformance than those with a lower degree of 
diversity, but only when combined with business strategies that value diversity 
as a strategic advantage. 
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There can be considered to be three reasons why organizations diversify: 
1) Access and legitimacy – diversifying because the organization needs to 
represent its stakeholders in order to gain access to markets;  
2) Discrimination and fairness – diversifying because restricting board 
access to certain demographic groups is unfair;  
3) Integration and learning – The organization wants to learn from new 
perspectives and integrate them into its business core. 
(Fitzsimmons 2012, 562.) 
According to Averill (2009, 10) There are six steps to a more diverse board: 
1) Make board diversity your public policy 
2) Collect information to make decisions 
3) Set measurable goals 
4) Recruit for diversity 
5) Accommodate diversity on your board 
6) Report on progress 
2.6.3 Quotas for women 
There has been an increasing interest in choosing female directors for external 
pressure and governance reasons. A few countries have already set quotas for 
female directors. Sweden has threatened to make legal requirements if at least 
25% of companies’ board seats are not reserved for women. In Norway at least 
40% of directors must be women or companies face dissolution. Spain has also 
enacted a law requiring companies to have at least 40% female directors in 
Spanish companies by 2015. (Adams & Ferreira 2009, 292.) 
Although many countries have passed quota legislation, Finland has not done it 
at least yet. According to a report by the Finland Chamber of Commerce (2012, 
4- 6. ) the amount of female directors in Finnish listed companies is already 
satisfactory and quotas for women are not needed. The Finnish governemet set 
a target of at least 40% of female directors in state- owned companies in 2004. 
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This target was reached in spring 2006. In Finland the business sector has 
assumed an active role in promoting women’s number on corporate boards. 
The number of female directors in Finnish listed companies has increased 
steadily from 7% in 2003 to 22% in 2012. This has happened without quota 
legislation and therefore quotas have not been seen as necessary in Finland. 
According to Fitzsimmons (2012, 560- 561) quotas for women have had a 
negative influence on firm performance. For example in Norway, after 40% 
quota for women in listed companies was introduced, there was  an average of 
2,6% drop in company value the year companies appointed female directors to 
comply with the law. This was not only for the gender reasons, but for the fact 
that new female directors lacked the experience and the usual requirements for 
board membership. Without quotas companies can hire the most qualified 
applicants based on their skills, experience and perspective instead of gender. 
Quotas can also affect the internal dynamics of a board. If a woman has been 
appointed on a board based on her gender, she is more likely to be ignored 
than somebody who has been selected for personal skills and other qualities.   
2.7 Board size and firm performance 
The actual amount of board members of a company has decreased universally 
recently. Finnish legislation requires companies to have at least three board 
members while the maximium size of a board is not restricted. The size of a 
board depends on the role of the board. Some boards might have a more 
service oriented role, while a bigger board consisiting of specialists and 
stakeholders should operate better. By growing the size of a board, companies 
tend to get in favour of many stakeholders at the same time. (Haapanen et. al 
2002, 146.) 
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There is not a single answer to what is a perfect amount of board members in a 
financial company. Bigger boards function the same way as bigger groups in 
general. A very big board is not efficient and it is very hard to deeply estimate 
the directorship problems of a company. If the board is big, it usually leads to a 
situation where a core group of the board is actually making all of the decisions. 
(Haapanen et. al 2002, 147.) 
It is easy to predict that in bigger boards the personal responsibility of each 
individual gets smaller. It is also common that bigger boards create insider 
groups and parts which increases inner conflicts and makes decision making 
harder. According to Haapanen et al. ( 2002, 147.) a board that has more than 
five members is not justifiable if the company does not lose critical skills or 
perspective by increasing the number of board members. In bigger boards it is 
easier for a member to trust another member to take care of a problematic 
dilemma.  
Owners and shareholders decide the size and the actual members of a board in 
shareholder’s meetings. There are many circumstances that affect these 
decisions. These include the willingness of owners to sit on the board, different 
skills and perspectives needed in the business and the company and the role of 
the board in general. (Erma et. al 2010, 24.) 
A negative relation between board size and performance is a common finding in 
non- financial sector studies. Directors might have problems expressing their 
opinions in meetings of a larger board. A single director’s incentive to monitor 
management and acquire information is low in larger boards, which might make 
them easier to control  for CEOs. Anyway, some studies argue that the relation 
between the size of a board and firm performance depends upon firm’s 
economic environment. Companies with higher advising needs (diversified and 
heavily dept- financed companies) might even benefit from larger boards. 
(Pathan & Faff 2013, 1575.) The effect of board size on bank value might also 
be a trade- off between advantages (monitoring and advising) and 
disadvantages (control, coordination and decision making problems) as De 
Andreas and Vallelado argue (2008, 2571- 2572.) 
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The results of studies of banks’ board size and performance are mixed. Studies 
present positive relation, concave relation and no relation between board size 
and firm performance. Pathan & Faff ( 2013, 1575) think that larger bank boards 
reflect their complex organisational structures and merger & acquisitions 
activities. They also think that a bank board could also grow by incorporating 
directors from subsidiaries to facilitate information flow and to accommodate 
additional directors from acquired or merged banks.  
Adams and Mehran (2011, 246) have studied banks’ board structure and 
performance and suggest that large boards may add value to banks. They 
argue that one of the reasons is that larger boards have members who also sit 
on subsidiary boards. Banking companies tend to have complex activities and 
Adams and Mehran found out that when complexity increases, firm 
performance improves when banks have their directors sitting on subsidiary 
boards. They also suggest that although they could not identify a causal effect 
of board size on performance, the advantages of larger boards outweigh their 
costs in the banking industry. 
Eisenberg et. al (1998, 53) have studied the relation between board size and 
firm performance in small and medium- sized Finnish companies and results 
show that the negative relation between board size and profitibality extends to 
small firms with small boards in Finland. They have found out that the board- 
size effects can exist even when there is less separation of ownership and 
control than in large firms.  
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3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.1 Sampling procedure and coverage 
There were 291 credit institutions operating in Finland at the end of 2014. 
These institutions include deposit banks as well as non deposit- taking 
institutions such as finance houses, credit card companies, mortgage credit 
banks and Municipality Fund Plc. (Federation of Finnish Financial Services 
2015, 3.) 
The data used in this paper was obtained from the BANKSCOPE database in 
summer 2015. A total of 49 active financial institutions with relevant data were 
found. 6 financial institutions had to be excluded from this study because of 
missing information. The final 43 financial institutions used in this paper include 
both deposit banks and non deposit- taking institutions that are operating and 
active in Finnish market. I obtained information of board (size), board members 
(gender) as well as key performance indicators such as net interest rate, return 
on assets and return on average equity. Information on each financial institution 
is from latest available year (2012- 2014). The data of 43 financial institutions 
was coded in SPSS data editor for further analyzing.  
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
3.2.1 Board structure variables 
I have chosen two board structure variables to be used in this paper. These are 
board size (pax) and gender (the percentage of females on a board). These are 
commonly used variables in similar studies (Pathan & Faff 2012.) (Siciliano 
1996.) Some researchers have added the percentage of independent directors 
(persons who are not owners of a company) as one of the board structure 
variables but I have excluded that for its irrelevance concerning this paper. 
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3.2.2 Descriptive statistics of board size 
Table 2 shows that most of the banks (51,2%) have 6 or 7 members and only 5 
banks have more than 10 members on the board. 
 
Table 2. Frequencies of board size 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 3 2 4.7 4.7 4.7 
4 1 2.3 2.3 7.0 
5 5 11.6 11.6 18.6 
6 11 25.6 25.6 44.2 
7 11 25.6 25.6 69.8 
8 3 7.0 7.0 76.7 
9 3 7.0 7.0 83.7 
10 2 4.7 4.7 88.4 
11 3 7.0 7.0 95.3 
12 1 2.3 2.3 97.7 
13 1 2.3 2.3 100.0 
Total 43 100.0 100.0  
 
 
The descriptive statistics of board size are presented in tables 2 and 3. The 
mean is 7,14 and median 7. Minimum board size of the sample is 3 and 
maximum is 13. Standard deviation is 2,253%. 
 
Table 3. Descriptives of board size 
 
 
N Valid 43 
Missing 0 
Mean 7.14 
Median 7.00 
Std. Deviation 2.253 
Minimum 3 
Maximum 13 
 TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Kasimir Sääksmäki 
 
32 
3.2.3 Descriptive statistics of gender diversity 
Table 4 shows that 10 banks (23,3%) don’t have any female members on the 
board and only 4 banks (9,3%) have 50% or more women on the board. 
 
Table 4.  Frequencies of the percentage of females on board 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0.00% 10 23.3 23.3 23.3 
9.09% 1 2.3 2.3 25.6 
11.11% 1 2.3 2.3 27.9 
14.28% 5 11.6 11.6 39.5 
16.66% 4 9.3 9.3 48.8 
18.18% 1 2.3 2.3 51.2 
20.00% 2 4.7 4.7 55.8 
22.00% 1 2.3 2.3 58.1 
27.27% 1 2.3 2.3 60.5 
28.57% 3 7.0 7.0 67.4 
30.00% 1 2.3 2.3 69.8 
33.00% 3 7.0 7.0 76.7 
37.50% 1 2.3 2.3 79.1 
40.00% 2 4.7 4.7 83.7 
42.85% 2 4.7 4.7 88.4 
44.44% 1 2.3 2.3 90.7 
50.00% 3 7.0 7.0 97.7 
60.00% 1 2.3 2.3 100.0 
Total 43 100.0 100.0  
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Tables 4 and 5 show that the mean of the percentage of females on board is 
21,81% and median is 18,18%. Minimum is 0,00% and maximum is 60,00%. 
Standard deviation is 17,04% 
 
Table 5. Descriptives of the percentage of females on board 
 
N Valid 43 
Missing 0 
Mean 21.8149% 
Median 18.1800% 
Std. Deviation 17.04333% 
Minimum 0.00% 
Maximum 60.00% 
 
 
3.2.4 Descriptive statistics of bank performance measures 
There are different indicators to measure bank performance. I have used three 
indicators that have often been used in studies concerning the relation between 
board structure and firm performance in banking. These indicators are ROAA 
(Return on average assets), ROAE (Retun on average equity) and NIM (Net 
interest margin).  They are commonly used indicators in measuring bank 
performance. 
ROAA is an indicator of how profitable company is relative to its total assets. It 
gives an idea how efficiently management is using its assets to generate 
earnings. It is calculated by dividing the company’s net income by its average 
total assets and presented as a percentage. ROAA is similar to ROA (Return on 
assets) but also takes into consideration the changes during the examined 
period. (Collin 1991, 207.) 
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ROAE is an adjusted version of ROE (Return on equity). Return on equity is 
calculated by dividing the company’s net income by its shareholder’s equity.  
ROAE also takes into account the changes on equity per fiscal year. If there 
have not been changes in shareholder’s equity, ROE and ROAE are identical. 
ROAE is presented as a percentage. (Collin 1991, 84.) 
NIM is an indicator that shows how succesful banks’ investment decisions are 
compared to its debt situations. If the value is negative, the bank has not made 
optimal decisions because interest expenses were larger than the amount of 
returns generated by investments. NIM is presented as a percentage and is 
calculated as: 
NIM= (Investment reurns- investment expenses) / Average earning assets 
(Collin 1991, 125.) 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of NIM%, ROAA%, ROAE% 
 
 NIM% ROAA % ROAE% 
N Valid 43 43 43 
Missing 0 0 0 
Mean 1.2521 .8242 5.7735 
Median 1.1800 .4100 4.7400 
Std. Deviation .79027 1.81248 6.35764 
Minimum -.22 -3.25 -6.98 
Maximum 4.01 8.64 29.73 
    
 
 
The mean of net interest margin 1,25% while median is 1,18%. Standard 
deviation is 0,79. Minimum is -0,22% and maximum is 4,01%. The mean of 
ROAA is 0,82% and median is 0,41%. Standard deviation of ROAA is 1,81. 
Minimum is -3,25% while maximum is 8,64%. The mean of ROAE is 5,77% and 
median is 4,74%. Standard deviation is 6,36. Mimimum is -6,98% and the 
maximum of ROAA is 29,73%. 
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3.3 Scatterplots and Correlation matrixes 
A scatterplot analysis was made in order to estimate the linearity between 
variables and the results are shown in table 7. 
 
Table 7. Scatterplot analysis between variables 
 
 
 
Table 7 shows the relationship between continuous variables of the data and 
the fit line at total has been added to see positive and negative linearity 
between variables. There is a linear relationship between variables but 
relationships are not strong. There is no indication of curvlinear relationships 
and therefore it is appropriate to calculate Pearson product moment correlation 
between the variables. 
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Table 8. Sample correlations 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 shows Pearson pairs- wise correlations of the sample. The correlation 
between board size and bank performance measures is positive, but only the 
correlation between board size and ROAE% is significant. The correlation 
between the percentage of females and bank performance measures NIM% 
and ROAA% is negative but not significant. There is a significant correlation 
between ROAE% and ROAA%. 
 
 
 
Size 
(pax) 
Percentage of females in 
board NIM% ROAA% ROAE% 
Size (pax) Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.004 .034 .234 .483** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .982 .831 .131 .001 
N 43 43 43 43 43 
Percentage of females in 
board 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.004 1 -.113 -.020 .028 
Sig. (2-tailed) .982  .471 .901 .858 
N 43 43 43 43 43 
NIM% Pearson 
Correlation 
.034 -.113 1 -.029 -.187 
Sig. (2-tailed) .831 .471  .852 .229 
N 43 43 43 43 43 
ROAA% Pearson 
Correlation 
.234 -.020 -.029 1 .575** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .131 .901 .852  .000 
N 43 43 43 43 43 
ROAE% Pearson 
Correlation 
.483** .028 -.187 .575** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .858 .229 .000  
N 43 43 43 43 43 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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These results suggest that increase in board size has a positive impact on bank 
performance regarding return on average equity. Results also suggest that 
there is not any significant relation between bank performance and the 
percentage of females on a board in Finnish banking. 
3.4 The results of multiple regression analyses 
3.4.1 Net Interest Margin 
In tables 9, 10 and 11 are shown the results of regression analysis when Net 
interest margin (NIM%) was used as a dependent variable and size and 
percentage of females as independent variables.  
 
Table 9. Model summary (Dependent variable NIM%) 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .118a .014 -.035 .80415 
Predictors: (Constant), Percentage of females in board, Size (pax) 
Dependent Variable: NIM% 
 
 
The R Square column in table 9 shows that size of a board and the percentage 
of females have little or any relation to NIM%. R Square value is .014 which 
means that the model (including size and percentage of females) explains 1,4% 
of the variance in Net interest margin.  
Table 10. ANOVA (Dependent variable NIM%) 
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .364 2 .182 .281 .756b 
Residual 25.866 40 .647   
Total 26.230 42    
Dependent Variable: NIM% 
Predictors: (Constant), Percentage of females in board, Size (pax) 
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There is not a statistical significance in this result which can be seen from table 
10, where Sig= .756, i.e p> .0005. 
 
 
Table 11. Coefficients (Dependent variable NIM%) 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.283 .442  2.904 .006 
Size (pax) .012 .055 .033 .211 .834 
Percentage of females in 
board 
-.005 .007 -.113 -.719 .476 
Dependent Variable: NIM% 
 
 
By looking at standardized coefficients in table 11 it can be concluded that the 
percentage of females on the board makes a slightly stronger contribution to 
NIM% but this variable is not making a significant unique contribution since Sig 
is > .05. 
3.4.2 Return on average assets 
In this chapter I introduce the results of multiple regression analysis when 
Return on average assets (ROAA%) was used as a dependent variable and 
size and percentage of females as independent variables.   
 
Table 12. Model summary (Dependent variable ROAA%) 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .235a .055 .008 1.80536 
Predictors: (Constant), Percentage of females in board, Size (pax) 
Dependent Variable: ROAA % 
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The R Square in table 12 is .055, i.e size and percentage of females explains 
5,5% of the variation in Return on average assets. 
 
Table 13. ANOVA (Dependent variable ROAA%) 
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 7.601 2 3.801 1.166 .322b 
Residual 130.373 40 3.259   
Total 137.974 42    
a. Dependent Variable: ROAA % 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Percentage of females in board, Size (pax) 
 
 
The result is not statistically significant since Sig. in table 13 is greater than 
.0005. The size of a board makes a stronger contribution to ROAA but this 
unique contribution is not significant since Sig > .05. This is shown in table 14. 
 
Table 14. Coefficients (Dependent variable ROAA%) 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -.476 .992  -.480 .634 
Size (pax) .188 .124 .234 1.522 .136 
Percentage of females in 
board 
-.002 .016 -.019 -.122 .904 
a. Dependent Variable: ROAA % 
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3.4.3 Return on average equity 
This chapter shows the empirical results of regression analysis when Return on 
average equity (ROAE) was used as a dependent variable and size and 
percentage of females as independent variables.   
 
Table 15. Model summary (Dependent variable ROAE%) 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .484a .234 .196 5.70200 
Predictors: (Constant), Percentage of females in board, Size (pax) 
Dependent Variable: ROAE% 
 
Table 15 shows that the percentage of females and size of a board explain 
23,4% of the variance in ROAE%. 
 
 
Table 16. ANOVA (Dependent variable ROAE%) 
 
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 397.110 2 198.555 6.107 .005b 
Residual 1300.514 40 32.513   
Total 1697.624 42    
Dependent Variable: ROAE% 
Predictors: (Constant), Percentage of females in board, Size (pax) 
 
 
The result can be considered statistically significant since Sig = .005 in 
table 16. By comparing standardized coefficients in table 17 it can be 
concluded that size has a significant unique contribution to ROAE%. This 
suggests that increase in board size has a positive relation to ROAE% in 
the Finnish banking industry. 
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Table 17. Coefficients (Dependent variable ROAE%) 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 
-4.198 3.134  
-
1.340 
.188 
Size (pax) 1.363 .391 .483 3.489 .001 
Percentage of females in 
board 
.011 .052 .030 .216 .830 
Dependent Variable: ROAE% 
 
3.5 Discussion of empirical results 
The results of the regression analyses show that variation in board size or the 
percentage of females on a board predict firm performance badly in Finnish 
banking. In other words, it can’t be expected that bigger boards would perform 
better or vice versa. Although there is a statistically significant relation between 
board size and ROAE%, it is hard to conclude that an increase in board size 
would definitely lead to better firm performance since no statistically significant 
relation between board size and NIM% or ROAA% was found. The results of 
regression analyses also suggest that gender diversity doesn’t have impact on 
firm performance in Finnish banking. 
Adams and Mehran (2011, 266) have found a positive relation between the 
increase in board size and firm performance and the results of this thesis 
support that. Adams and Mehran suggest that their results are based on the fact 
that bigger boards have more directors with subsidiary directorships. These 
directors may be well suited to deal with organizational complexity.  
It was hypothesised that there is not a significant relation between the amount 
of women and firm performance in Finnish banking. The empirical results 
support this hypothesis because the regression analyses results clearly show 
that there is very little if any relation between the  percentage of women on a 
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board and firm performance. The hyphothesis was made based on earlier 
studies on the topic and are presented in chapter 1.2. 
The other hypothesis suggesting that increase in board size would have 
negative impacts on firm performance is false since the results show that there 
is not any statistically significant negative relation between board size and firm 
performance. Actually, it was found out that an increase in board size would 
rather have a positive impact on performance indicators. The theoretical 
background of this hypothesis is presented in chapter 1.2. 
There are a few conclusions that can be drawn based on the results of this 
study. Unsurprisingly, the amount of women on a board has very little effect on 
firm performance in Finnish banking. The average amount of women on a board 
was 21,8% in the sample and it can be considered to be relatively high when we 
compare it to 15,2% in listed US companies in 2010.  
The amount of women directors is steadily growing in Finnish companies and 
according to the results of this paper it does not have any significant negative 
impact on firm performance. This could give a positive signal to the supporters 
of women quotas, but as there were less than 10% of banks that had 50% or 
more women on boards in my data, it is hard to conclude that a big number of 
women on boards would actually lead to a better firm performance.  
It seems that the current development where the amount of women on boards 
increases steadily but not heavily is the natural and right way. Board selection is 
based on individual skills and as the amount of qualified women grows, the 
boards also diversify naturally and not by regulators and legislators who tend to 
have other purposes than firm performance. Anyway, it would be important to 
compare the results of firm performance and gender diversity over a longer 
period as it would give a better understanding of the development. This is one 
of the limitations of my paper since I have not included a longer timeline which 
could help to draw better conclusions of the relation between gender diversity 
on boards and firm performance in Finnish banking. 
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It is positive to note that there is a neutral relation between firm performance 
and gender diversity of boards in Finnish banking. This gives little space for 
extreme masculinist thoughts that men would be better performing directors and 
women somehow naturally inferior to men.  
Fitzsimmons (2012, 558- 559) lists stereotypes, access to networks, limited 
recruitment pool and missing leadership as the barriers for female board 
access. The results of this paper suggest that these barriers should be fading 
away because gender diversity of the board does not have a significant impact 
on firm performance in Finnish banking industry. 
The results of the relation between board size and firm performance in the 
Finnish banking industry are surprising as they differ from most of the earlier 
studies. More than half of the boards in the sample had 6 or 7 members, which 
can be considered as small boards. The variation on board size in Finnish 
banks was from 3 to 13 members and therefore even the biggest boards in 
Finnish banks can not be considered as very big boards. The variation of board 
size is small and it is hard to expect that a board with 13 members would face a 
lot of free riding and complexity problems in decision making.  Some earlier 
studies, that have found a negative relation between board size and firm 
performance (e.g Pathan and Faff 2013) have had a much bigger variation in 
board size which might have had a significant contribution to their results. 
It would be interesting to see the results of similar studies in other Nordic states 
where the banking business can be considered similar to Finnish banking 
industry. It would be especially interesting to see the results from Norway, 
where they have women quotas and compare them to the results of other 
Nordic countries.  
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3.6 The validity and reliability of the results 
The boards of directors of Finnish banks tend to be homogeneous in size and 
gender diversity and therefore these variables could not be considered as 
especially well fit predictors of firm performance in Finnish banking. This is one 
of the limitations of this paper and future studies on the topic should include the 
impact of inside and outside directors on firm performance, too. Anyway, the 
variables used in this paper are often used in similar studies, e.g (Pathan and 
Faff 2013.), (Eisenberg et. al 1998.), (Adams and Ferreira 2009.) and can 
therefore be considered as the best possible variables in studies concerning the 
relation between the board structure and firm performance. 
I included 43 active financial institutions in this paper. The total amount of active 
financial institutions in the Finnish market was 291 in 2014. (Federation of 
Finnish Financial Services 2015, 3.). The data used in this paper represents 
14,7% of the financial institutions in the Finnish market and consists of different 
types of banks. There are big banks and smaller ones and the sample consists 
of both Finnish and international banks. Therefore these results are valid and 
the sample is the best one that is available. 
I have used regression analysis as the research method in this thesis and it is 
an established method in similar studies. The multiple regression analysis is 
suitable for this research as it is designed to find the possible causality between 
variables. I also have made the correlation and scatterplot checks and 
presented the statistical significance of the results. 
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4 CONCLUSION 
The banking and finance industry has an enormous impact on all businesses 
and therefore it is important to study the relation between board structure and 
firm performance. The findings of studies can be used as strategic management 
tools for nominating commitees as well as giving information to bank regulators 
in order to maintain a sound regulation policy that would lead to better 
performing banks.  
This current thesis has introduced the essential theories linked to board 
structure and firm performance. I have first introduced different aspects of 
governance, regulation and the history of the Finnish banking as they have 
been partially creating more pressure to add more women on boards in Finnish 
banking. I also have introduced the recent literature of gender diversity and 
board size as the results of earlier studies on these topics were essentially 
leading to the expectations that I have presented in my hyphotheses.  
The results of this study support the ideology that board memberships should 
be based on individual skills rather than gender. This result is a message to 
bank regulators and supporters of women quotas. As it was earlier pointed out, 
the governance and regulation of banks is increasing continuously. The 
regulation and governance acts should be based on other aspects than gender 
diversity because the amount of women seems to be increasing naturally and 
the gender diversity of the boards has very little impact on firm performance. I 
found a significant positive relation between board size and return on average 
equity in Finnish banking, which is an important result because most of the 
earlier similar studies have only shown a negative relation between board size 
and firm performance. 
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